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Abstract
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating
national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality,
and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally
among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contribu-
tions, knowing that if they fail they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability.
We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target, but that communication
increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course
of the game, with rich players signalling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results sug-
gest that coordinative institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations may
widen our window of opportunity to avoid global climate calamity.
Preserving the global climate commons is one of the biggest collective action problems humanity
has ever faced (1 ); evidence suggests that we have already exceeded the planet’s “safe operating
space” in the climate system (2 ). Containing the rise in global mean temperature is a global
public good, where the benefits of efforts to reduce emissions are shared by all, irrespective of
individual contributions. Such disconnect between individual and collective interest is a prime
cause of public goods under-provision (3 -7 ). Whereas public goods experiments under controlled
conditions oversimplify the complexity of international climate action (8 ), they nonetheless shed
light on the relative importance of factors that affect its success (9 ). Standard public good games
are concerned with the creation of a collective gain (10 -15 ). Climate change, however, is about
avoiding an uncertain public bad. This has been framed as a “collective-risk social dilemma” of
sequential contributions to a public climate fund aimed at avoiding a probabilistic loss arising if
the target is missed (16 ). Participants in this threshold public goods experiment behaved less
rationally than theory predicted, often failing to avoid simulated dangerous climate change due to
miscoordination in final rounds (17 ). But what will be the outcome if participants can communicate
with one another? And what is the effect of inequality on effort coordination?
International progress in reducing CO2 emissions has been remarkably slow, not least because
of free-riding incentives, as partly captured by the threshold public goods game of loss avoidance
(16 ). The core of this game, however, is a problem of coordination: players are best off when
synchronizing contributions in the face of multiple equilibria (3, 18 ). The game therefore calls for
communication. The latest climate agreements negotiated in Copenhagen and Cancun introduced
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a pledge and review system of voluntary emission reduction commitments for 2020 (19 ). Can such
a simple mechanism of communicating intentions be effective to enhance coordination?
Optimism from reaching a global agreement following Cancun is shadowed by concerns over
implementation and particularly whether richer nations will go far enough in financing abatement
and adaptation for poorer nations (20 ). Equity concerns over the distribution of emission cuts and
associated costs are at the heart of the sustainability of international climate change action (21 ).
Inequality has been studied extensively in the context of collective action problems: the presence
of inequality is often found to complicate cooperation (22 -25 ), though communication between
users tends to improve the likelihood of cooperation (26, 27 ). Different patterns of interaction are
observed depending on the type and cause of inequality and on the type of resource at stake (28 ).
Given these findings we examine whether and how inequality and potential differences in equity
concerns between rich and poor affect their ability to coordinate efforts.
An essential feature of the global climate change game is that inequality in endowments is
mirrored by inequality in past appropriation of the climate commons; roughly speaking, the richer
a nation is, the more it has “used” the atmosphere by emitting CO2 (29, 30 ). We introduce
and test in the lab the effects of inherited inequality in wealth and appropriation on coordination
success in reaching a safety target, and how this is mediated through communication of contribution
intentions. 240 students took part in the experiment, and were randomly assigned to groups of
six. As in (16 ), each player was endowed with €40 which could be invested in climate protection.
Players could choose between an investment of either €0, €2 or €4 per round. The target was
to collectively invest €120 by the tenth and final round, in order to avoid simulated dangerous
climate change and to secure what was left on the private account. Groups that failed to invest
at least €120 lost all their savings with a 50% probability. Players did not know the identity of
their team’s members; after each round they were informed about the others’ contributions, the
aggregate group contribution in that round and the cumulative past contribution of each player
and of the group as a whole (31 ).
To capture the idea of inheritance of past wealth and debt, we started the game with three
inactive rounds where players had no freedom to choose, as contributions were determined by the
computer. In the control treatment (“Base”), the computer allocated symmetrically to all players
€2/round. In the “Base-Unequal” treatment, the computer allocated asymmetrically to half of the
group €4/round and to the other half €0/round. “Rich” players hence entered round four with €40
and “poor” players with €28. In separate treatments players were given the option to announce
what they planned to invest during the game, one time at the end of the three inactive rounds and
again at the end of round seven. Pledges were nonbinding. The “Pledge” treatment introduced
the pledges to the symmetric case while the “Pledge-Unequal” treatment implemented the pledges
in the asymmetric case.
The multiplicity of equilibria in the game makes classification virtually impossible. The game
is a modified n-person stochastic threshold public goods game, with a total of ten rounds of which
only seven allow freedom of choice over the three possible actions. Both contributing nothing and
2€ in each round are (symmetric) Nash equilibria, since unilateral deviations are non-profitable
(32, Table 1). Depending on the round and the path that led to it, a round contribution of €4
bringing the individual sum above €20 may still be optimal if successful in guaranteeing that past
investments are not wasted. Conversely, if at a certain stage the target becomes out of reach
because of insufficient members’ contributions, one’s best response is to stop contributing and play
the odds.
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Table 1: End payoffs in € (and corresponding climate account values for the group) arising if the
3 pure strategies were adopted by all players for the 7 active rounds. Asterisks refer to expected
values based on the 50% probability of account loss when the target sum of €120 is not reached.
In the symmetric treatments (Base and Pledge), all group members begin the active play having
contributed €6 in the previous 3 rounds, leaving them with a disposable endowment of €34; in
the asymmetric treatments (Base-Unequal and Pledge-Unequal), three rich players have no prior
contributions and the three poor players have prior contributions of €12, leaving them with €40
and €28 respectively.
In the symmetric treatments each group trajectory leading to a cumulative contribution of €120,
irrespective of individual contributions provided that each subject invests at most €22 overall, is
a Nash equilibrium. This is the case since the latter investment translates into a payoff of €18,
which is above the €17 that is expected when all players choose not to contribute to the public
good (second column in Table 1). Therefore, individuals can maximize the payoff of the game by
choosing the intermediate level of contribution, invest a further €14 over rounds 4 to 10 and secure
the €20.
In the asymmetric treatments, due to the different disposable endowments of rich and poor
players, the former gain the most when the climate is protected with equal burden sharing in
the active rounds (€26, resulting from an investment of €14). Relative to the no contribution
equilibrium, it is more appealing as the rich will be at least as well off when investing at most €20.
The poor, on the other hand, do not stand to gain from the equal burden sharing equilibrium in
the active rounds, assuming risk neutrality: given the early rounds contributions of €12, only by
investing less than €14 in the active rounds (and the group still reaching the threshold) can these
players have a higher expectation than by not investing in the public good.
The game design allows for such redistribution. The rich have a surplus of €6 in the 2€/active
round equilibrium relative to the poor, and can in principle forgo part or all of it by investing more
and allowing the poor to correspondingly decrease their investment. An average of €3/round for
the rich and €1/round for the poor almost exactly equalize contributions (and expected payoffs)
among the players. With full redistribution, rich and poor have a final payoff of €20, which for
the rich is still rational in the sense of not being welfare diminishing relative to not contributing
anything.
Results show that inequality makes success harder, but that the pledge option increases success
dramatically (Figure 1). Both pledge treatments were well above the corresponding ones without
pledges. Income inequality reduced the prospects of success: 5/10 groups succeeded in the Base
treatment, vs. 2/10 in Base-Unequal. In the latter, investment by the failing groups was €15 higher
(n=13, P=.0393, two-sided Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test), indicating that inequality
also led to poorer coordination on the non-provision outcome. The pledge option had more effect
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Figure 1: Success rate in avoiding dangerous climate change. The bottom two treatments are
symmetric, the top two are asymmetric. The blue sections of the bars indicate the % of successful
groups (with red contours for the treatments with communication), while the grey sections indicate
the corresponding failing rate. For both group classes, error bars and the average investment
(inclusive of the €36 collected in the first three rounds) are shown in the insets. Only in Pledge
was the outcome somewhat close to the rational prediction of all groups reaching the target (n=10,
P=.0816, binomial test). Further regressions in the Supporting material.
under conditions of inequality: success rates tripled from 2/10 in Base-Unequal to 6/10 in Pledge-
Unequal (n=20, P=.085, one-sided Fisher’s exact test). The latter success rate (6/10) is not
significantly different from the 7/10 achieved by participants of the symmetric Pledge treatment
(P=.500), indicating that inequality is a less serious threat once a better coordination mechanism
is introduced.
Although nonbinding, players respected pledges: following the second pledge, average cumula-
tive contributions in rounds 8-10 were €31.8 and €30 in Pledge-Unequal and Pledge respectively,
and the stated amounts were €32.6 and €29.6. The closer the pledges to actual contributions,
the higher the probability of group success: as the difference between cumulative contributions
and pledged amounts increases, the probability of a player being in a successful group decreases
significantly (Figure 2).
Successful groups were strikingly effective in eliminating the inherited inequality: in the two
Unequal treatments, the difference in contributions between rich and poor players belonging to suc-
cessful groups is not significant (€20 contributed by both, two-sided MWW test, n=16, P=0.8195).
Even in the absence of communication, participants of successful groups tacitly coordinated on an
equalizing redistribution, which offset the original endowment asymmetry (Figure 3). Conversely,
the difference in contributions between rich and poor is significant in failing groups (€16 by the
rich and €21 by the poor, n=24, P=.0138), indicating that such redistribution did not take place.
Signalling early on willingness to invest in the public good rather than to gamble was critical for
the fate of the game. Successful groups provided on average €1.92 in round four, while failing
groups provided €1.25 (significant difference, two-sided MWW test, n=40, P=0.0001). Early sig-
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nFigure 2: The probability that a player belongs to a successful group decreases with the
contribution-pledge gap, i.e. with the differences between cumulative contributions and the corre-
sponding amounts pledged both early (rounds 4-10, Probit, P=.0019) and later in the game (rounds
8-10, Probit, P=.0324). All regressions with group-cluster robust standard errors to take in ac-
count outcome interdependence among participants; see (29 ) for regression tables and marginal
effects interpretation. The top panels visually confirm the link between success and adherence to
the initial pledge: for the groups that provided the public good (A) the gap is tighter than for the
unsuccessful ones (B), as indicated by the dispersion around the bisector. Similarly for the second
pledge, greater clustering around the bisector takes place in (C) than in (D); a small random noise
(5%) has been inserted to make all data points visible.
nals by the rich of willingness to redistribute were decisive in the asymmetric games. On average,
rich players in successful groups contributed €3.17 in round 4, while they contributed €2.06 in
failing groups (significant difference, two-sided MWW test, n=20, P=0.0054). Cumulative contri-
butions by the rich over rounds 4 to 6 were €9.83 in successful groups, while the rich in failing
groups appeared to be unwilling to commit to early redistribution and invested only €6.67 (n=20,
P=0.0040).
The questionnaire which followed the game (31 ) confirms that the rich’s fairness perceptions
and willingness to redistribute were decisive for success: being confronted with the statement that
“the rich players should contribute more during the active rounds than the poor players”, 75% of
the rich in successful groups but only 53% of the rich in failing groups agreed with that claim (one-
sided Fisher’s exact test, n=60, P=0.071). Therefore the rich’s opinion in that question and the
group’s success are significantly correlated (Spearman’s correlation test, n=60, P=0.0855). Sub-
jects’ responses furthermore show a clear self-serving bias of fairness perceptions: the acceptance
of the above claim is highly dependent on the player’s wealth (Spearman’s correlation test, n=120,
P=0.0002). In numbers: 90% of the poor but only 62% of the rich support the claim for redistri-
bution (one-sided Fisher’s exact test, n=120, P=0.000). This bias, which has been found also in
climate negotiations (21 ), appears to be an important determinant for effective coordination.
Extrapolation from our results should be cautious (33 ): controlling CO2 emissions is a much
more complex task than the one of coordination on a known threshold faced by the subjects of this
experiment (3, 18 ). Yet, the finding that inequality hampers coordination and makes a coordinative
institution indispensable is important: countries can be expected to coordinate their national efforts
to reach a common goal provided that they agree on a common fairness notion. Disagreement
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Figure 3: In successful groups partaking in the treatments with unequal endowments (Base-Unequal
and Pledge-Unequal), the rich compensated the poor by investing more in the active rounds and
equalized cumulative contributions over the entire game at €20 (A). In failing groups such wealth
redistribution didn’t take place to the same extent: the initial gap of €12 between the rich and
poor was not fully offset, as the former invested €16 on average while the latter €21 (B).
in contrast may lead to early political lock-ins and disastrous consequences. Future research is
needed to bring more realism and complexity in the collective-risk social dilemma, introducing
uncertain thresholds and gradual climate change for instance. Climate change also entails not
only asymmetry in wealth and carbon debt, but also asymmetry in adaptation capacity and risk
exposure (34 ). Losses, even under catastrophic climate change, will be unequally distributed
depending on countries’ income or location (35, 36 ). Different types of inequality stand to have
different effects, more so when in concert (37 ). The shape of the wealth distribution may also
affect outcomes: while an increase in inequality may well enhance the incentives for the rich to
contribute more, such increase may simultaneously reduce the incentives for the poor (29 ). The
behavior of players also changes depending on the origin of inequality, as shown in experiments
comparing merit-based to random wealth allocation (38, 39 ).
Nevertheless, it is tempting to relate the basic structure of this game to the current stage of
climate talks. Signaling commitment to contribute early on appears decisive for coordination.
The Cancun agreement is short in abatement ambitions, but its success in restoring confidence
in the commitment of nations to take action rather than gamble may prove decisive. Success in
providing the global climate protection good is inextricably related to the willingness of the rich
to take up early on a sizeable share of the burden. We find evidence that the poor are not willing
to compensate for the rich’s inaction. These findings suggest that early leadership by the richer
nations and appropriate coordination mechanisms are instrumental to the avoidance of disastrous
climate change.
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1 Methods and Materials
1.1 Methodological details
Most experiments on public goods utilize linear public goods games, where participants have the
option to invest a fraction of their endowments in a public good by means of a voluntary contri-
butions mechanism (S1 ). Typically, the returns to the investment are equally shared among the
participants according to the marginal per capita return. We depart from this standard formu-
lation in many ways. First, the provision of the public good is sequential, as multiple stages of
contributions (10 rounds) are performed before the assessment of the group effectiveness in pre-
venting simulated catastrophic climate change. Second, the objective of the game is to avoid a loss
rather than creating a surplus by contributing to a public good (with higher group contributions
leading to higher returns to the players). Here players’ contributions to the public good make
them collectively better off only insofar they are sufficient to reach a threshold by the final round
(€120). All contributions below (or above) it are wasted, as they fail to secure the keeping of the
private accounts by the participants (or have no additional benefit if above the threshold). This
feature leads to the next salient one, concerning the probabilistic nature of the losses. To account
for the uncertainty involved in climatic change, the actions of the six players forming a group
taking part in the game have consequences that are not deterministic. If they collectively fail to
reach the target required to avoid climate catastrophe, they will lose their savings on the private
account (what is left of the initial €40 endowment after the contributions to the public good) with
a probability of 50%. As both the climate threshold and the probability of the climate catastrophe
are known, the players’ primary challenge here is to coordinate rather than to just increase their
contributions (S2 ).
The probability of the climate catastrophe was chosen in the light of the results of the experi-
ment by Milinski et al. (S3 ), who developed and tested the above departures, and which we aim to
enrich with features that will be discussed below. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at their
experiment. In a nutshell, they implemented the above setup, with individuals deciding in each
of the ten rounds of the game whether to contribute either €0, €2, or €4 to the climate account,
with each group being presented with one of three different treatments corresponding to three
probabilities of savings’ loss: 90%, 50% and 10%. These yielded the following levels of success in
avoiding simulated climate change: 50%, 10% and 0%. That is with the highest stakes, due to the
larger gains in expected value from reaching the target, coordination was most effective and half of
the participating groups where successful in collecting at least €120, while only one group out of
ten succeeded in the 50% treatment and no group succeeded in the treatment with 10% probability
of incurring the loss. Note that the last result is not surprising from a rationality standpoint, as a
player contributing €0 in all rounds would have expected earnings of €36 compared to earnings of
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€20 and €0 by following the remaining two pure strategies of €2/round and €4/round contribu-
tions. Only in the 90% treatment the social optimum coincides with the strategy of €2/round, as
it would lead to certain earnings of €20 if adopted by all subjects, compared to expected earnings
of €4 if all adopt the €0/round strategy and a certain outcome of €0 if they follow the €4/round
strategy.
Our basic experimental design closely follows (S3 ), with six individuals playing together in
a group, each endowed with €40. The players decided in each of the active rounds of the game
whether to contribute either €0 (“no contribution”), €2 (“intermediate contribution”), or €4 (“high
contribution”) to the climate account. All groups were presented with the probability of savings’
loss of 50%. This was chosen because, as illustrated in Table 1 in the main text, it favors the
symmetric equilibrium where all contribute €2/round (at least in symmetric treatments and in
asymmetric treatments for rich players) over the no contribution equilibrium, while retaining a
high temptation to defect and take a gamble. Further, we avoided extreme probabilities (such as
10% and 90% in S3 ) to avoid confusion with certain outcomes and in particular for the following
reasons: 10% disaster probability makes the game trivial, from a game theoretic perspective, as
players are better off by not providing the public good; 90% probability, on the other hand, makes
the noncooperative equilibrium unattractive due to almost certain loss in case of failure to reach
the target. After each round the players were informed about all individual contributions and
the aggregate group contribution in that round as well as the cumulative past contribution of
each player and the group. As in (S3 ), players were assigned nicknames in order to keep their
identity private. Since the focus of this paper is to test in the lab for the role of inhereted
inequalities in informing the debate on climate change, we introduced a series of treatments aimed
at capturing features of asymmetry among participants in terms of wealth, past contributions and
future commitment announcements.
In order to induce subjects to perceive the inequalities among them as the result of past actions,
we modified the game described above by replacing the first three rounds with three inactive
ones where half of the group had only the option of choosing a €0/round contribution, while the
remaining three players were bound to a €4/round contribution, as follows:
That is, rather than externally imposing different endowments from the beginning of the ex-
periment, players were all told they had the full €40 endowment before the start, but witnessed
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through the first three rounds a growing divergence between high and low contributors. As a result
of these three inactive rounds, the players began the active play consisting of seven rounds with
substantial ’inherited’ differences: those who forcefully contributed €12 prior to round 4 had €28
left in their private accounts, while those who previously did not contribute anything to the public
good found themselves with the entire endowment available for the ensuing seven rounds. We call
this treatment “Base-Unequal”. The current generation inherited wealth (and “debts”) from the
first generation without having a say on it, but simply as the result of past actions. This situation
is reminiscent of global CO2 emissions, with developed countries owing much of their prosperity
to past carbon-intensive industrialization, relative to developing countries with historically and
proportionately smaller carbon footprints and wealth.
To single out the effect on coordination of the introduced asymmetry, a “Base” treatment
has been performed without such unequalizing redistribution. In it, subjects went through three
inactive rounds where they all had no other option than to choose the intermediate contribution
of €2 per round. These three inactive rounds might render the intermediate strategy more focal;
for a more in depth discussion, refer to Section 2.2.
Finally, since in coordination games, communication is not simply ‘cheap talk’ but may have
an important effect on the ability to coordinate, we implemented two treatments in which the
subjects had the opportunity to make future commitment announcements. The “Pledge” treat-
ment introduced two pledge stages to the symmetric case while the “Pledge-Unequal” treatment
implemented two pledge stages in the asymmetric case. In both pledge treatments it was common
knowledge that the pledges were nonbinding. The first pledge stage was after the (fixed) first three
rounds. The subjects simultaneously and independently announced their intended contributions
for the subsequent seven rounds. Afterwards the players saw the “intended climate account” which
contained the individual contributions from the first three (inactive) rounds plus the individual
pledges. Thereby they immediately detected whether the intended contributions would be suffi-
cient to avoid catastrophic climate change. The second pledge stage took place after round seven.
Similar to the first pledge, the players simultaneously and independently announced their intended
contributions for the last three rounds and were subsequently informed about the “new intended
climate account” that included past contributions and the pledges. Table S1 summarizes the key
features of our experimental design and the number of participants in each session.
The experiment was run in May 2010 at the MaxLab laboratory at the University of Magdeburg,
Germany. In total, 240 students participated in the experiment, whereby the pool consisted of a
mixture of students with an economic or business major (60%) and students with a non-economic
major (40%). Most of the students were experienced as they had participated in three or more
experiments before (88%) while only few students were inexperienced (12%). Sixty subjects took
part in each treatment. No subject participated in more than one treatment. Sessions lasted about
60 minutes. For each session, we recruited either 12 or 18 subjects. Each subject was seated at
linked computer terminals that were used to transmit all decision and payoff information. We
used the Z-tree software (S4 ) for programming. Once the individuals were seated and logged
into the terminals, a set of written instructions were handed out. Experimental instructions (see
Section 1.2) included a numerical example and control questions in order to ensure that all subjects
understood the games. At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to
groups of six. The subjects were not aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know
that they remained within the same group of players throughout the ten rounds. After the final
round, the players were informed whether the group had successfully reached the threshold of
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Table S1: Summary of experimental design
€120. Afterwards they were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed
to elicit the players’ impressions and motivation during the game (see Section 3.4). At the end
of the experiment, one of two table tennis balls was publicly drawn from a bag by a volunteer
student. If there was the number 1 on the ball, all players in the groups that had not reached the
threshold kept the money (that was left on their private account). If there was the number 2 on
the ball, these players lost their money. Out of the 20 groups which did not reach the threshold
11 groups were in good luck and kept their money while 9 groups were in bad luck and lost their
money. No show-up fee was administered. On average, a subject earned €17.23 in the games; the
maximum payoff was €40 and the minimum €0.
The money allocated to the climate account was used to buy and withdraw CO2 emission cer-
tificates traded in the European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS, S5 ). If a group had
successfully reached the threshold, all of the climate account money was used in this way. In case of
a failing group only half of the climate account money was used for emission certificates. Thereby,
we introduced a specific field context to the experiment which made the task more realistic and
might have increased participants’ motivation (although equally in all treatments). The experi-
mental instructions contained a short explanation of the EU ETS and the above mentioned rules
(see Section 1.2). We announced furthermore that the purchase and the suspension of certificates
would be certified by a notary and that the overall amount of certificates and the notarial ac-
knowledgment could be found at a permanent website (S6 ). Overall, we spent €3,248 for emission
certificates which corresponds to 212 tons of CO2 given a price of 15.3 €/ton (S7 ).
1.2 Experimental instructions for the treatments Pledge and Pledge-
Unequal (translated from German)
Welcome to the experiment!
1. General Notice
In this experiment you can earn money. To make this experiment a success, please do not talk
to the other participants at all or draw any other attention to you. Please read the following rules
of the experiment attentively. Should you have any questions please signal us. At the end of the
instructions you will find several control questions. Please answer all questions and signal us when
you have finished. We will then come to you and check your answers.
2. Climate Change
Now we will introduce you to a game simulating climate change. Global climate change is seen as
a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. The great majority of climate scientists expect
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the global average temperature to rise by 1.1 to 6.4 degrees Celsius until the year 2100. There
is hardly any denial that mankind largely contributes to climate change by emitting greenhouse
gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 originates from burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil
or natural gas in industrial processes and energy production, or combustion engines of cars and
lorries. CO2 is a global pollutant, i.e. each quantity unit of CO2 emitted has the same effect on
the climate regardless of the location where the emission has occurred.
3. Rules of Play
In total, 6 players are involved in the game, so besides you there are 5 other players. Every
player faces the same decision making problem. At the beginning of the experiment you will receive
a starting capital (= EUR 40) credited to your private account. During the experiment you can
use money from your account or not. In the end your account balance will be paid out to you in
cash. You will be making your decisions anonymously. To guarantee for this you will be assigned
a nickname for the playing time. The nicknames are the moons of our solar system (Ananke,
Telesto, Despina, Japetus, Kallisto or Metis). You will find your name on the lower left side of
your screen. During the course of the experiment you will be playing exactly 10 climate rounds.
In these rounds you can invest into the attempt to protect the climate and to evade dangerous
climate change. Among others, dangerous climate change will result in significant economic losses
which will be simulated in this experiment. In each climate round of the game all six players will
be asked simultaneously:
"How much do you want to invest into climate protection?"
Possible answers are EUR 0, 2 or 4. Only when each player has made his choice, all decisions
will be displayed simultaneously. After that the computer will credit all invested amounts to an
account for climate protection (“climate account”). At the end of the game (after exactly 10
rounds) the computer will compare the climate account balance with a predetermined amount (=
EUR 120). This amount must be earned to evade dangerous climate change. It will be earned if
every player averagely pays EUR 2 per round into climate protection. If this is the case, EUR 12
are be paid into the climate account per round. If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned, all
players will be paid out the amount remaining on their private accounts. The remaining amount
consists of the starting capital of EUR 40 minus the sum paid into the climate account. If the
necessary EUR 120 have not been earned, dangerous climate change will occur with a probability
of 50% (in 5 out of 10 cases) and this will result in significant economic losses. If this probability
arises you will lose all money left on your account and no one will be paid out anything. With
another probability of 50% (in 5 out of 10 cases) you will keep your money and will be paid out
the amount on your private account after the game. We will draw the probability by lot in your
presence. The payout will be made anonymously. Your fellow players will not learn about your
identity. Please note the following two particularities in the game: First, the decisions of the six
players in the first three rounds are predetermined by the computer. Meaning, you - and your
fellow players - cannot decide freely how much you want to invest into climate protection in the
first three rounds. You will be offered an option instead which you have to choose.
Please note that the predetermined investments of the first three rounds will already change
the amounts on the climate account and the players’ accounts! Starting in round 4 you will decide
freely which amounts you want to invest into climate protection. Second, all players can issue
declarations of intent about how much they want to invest into climate protection in the following
rounds. The declarations are not binding for the investment decisions in the following rounds. The
first declaration of intent is issued after round 3. All players will simultaneously state how much
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they plan to invest into climate protection in the next seven rounds in total. When all players have
stated their declarations of intent, the “planned climate account” will be displayed. The planned
climate account shows the investments of each player of the first 3 rounds plus the investments
planned for the remaining seven rounds. After round 7 all players will be given the opportunity
to revise their declarations of intent. All players then simultaneously state their planned total
investments into climate protection for the next three rounds. When all players have stated their
declarations of intent the “newly planned climate account” will be displayed. The newly planned
climate account shows how much each player has already invested in the first seven rounds plus
the planned investments for the remaining three rounds.
4. Example
In this example you see the decisions made by the six players in one round ( 6).
The column on the right side (“Investitionen Runde 6”) shows the investments made in the
current round. Players Ananke, Telesto and Despina have not paid anything into the climate
account, whereas players Japetus, Kallisto and Metis each have paid EUR 4. In total EUR 12
have been paid and by that been credited to the climate account. The column in the middle
(“Investitionen Runden 1-6 insgesamt”) shows the total investments made by each player in rounds
1-6. Players Ananke, Telesto and Kallisto each have paid EUR 12 into the climate account in the
first 6 rounds. Despina has paid EUR 14, Japetus EUR 10 and Metis EUR 8 in the first six rounds.
By that a total of EUR 68 has been paid into the climate account.
The column on the left (“geplantes Klimakonto Runden 1-10”) shows the planned climate
account after the first declaration of intent. The value stated per player shows the investments
made in the first three rounds plus the planned investments for the remaining seven rounds. Exactly
this information will be displayed after each climate round.
5. Usage of the Money on the Climate Account
If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned to evade climate change, we will buy CO2 emission
certificates of the total amount on the climate account and retire them. If the necessary EUR
120 have not been earned, we will use half of the amount on the climate account to buy CO2
emission certificates and retire them (we will keep the rest of the money). By purchasing and
retiring the CO2 emission certificates we contribute to the abatement of climate change. We will
now explain you how this works: In 2005 the European Union has implemented the emissions
trading system for carbon dioxide (CO2). Emissions trading is the central instrument of climate
policy in Europe. It follows a simple principle: The European Commission, together with the
member states, has determined the amount of CO2 to be emitted altogether in the respective
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sectors (energy production and energy intensive industries) until 2020. This total amount will be
distributed to the companies by the state in the form of emission rights (“certificates”). For each
quantity unit of CO2 emitted, the company has to give a certificate to the state. The certificates
can be traded between companies.
For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted e.g. by a power plant, the plant operator has to prove
his permission to do so in the form of a certificate. This leads to an important consequence: If
the total amount of certificates is reduced, the total emissions will be lower, simply because plant
operators do not possess enough emission allowances. That means if a certificate for one quantity
unit is obtained from the market and is being “retired” (i.e. deleted) the total CO2emissions are
reduced by exactly this quantity amount. The opportunity to retire certificates actually exists in
the framework of the EU Emissions Trading System. In Germany the German Emissions Trading
Authority (DEHSt) regulates Emissions trading. The authority holds a retirement account with the
account number DE-230-17-1. If certificates are transferred to this account they will be withdrawn
from circulation, i.e. deleted, by the end of each year. ZEW has opened an own account at
the DEHSt (DE-121-2810-0). The purchasing and retiring of the certificates will furthermore be
attested by a notary public. Summarizing: if all players have for example paid a total of EUR
120 into the climate account, we will buy certificates for about 8 tons of CO2 (the price per ton is
currently at about EUR 15). This equals the emissions of a ride in a VW Golf (1.4 TSI) one and
a half times around the world.
6. Control questions
If you have finished reading the instructions and do not have questions, please answer the
following control questions.
a. Which total amount does each player have to averagely invest into climate protection in the
10 rounds to evade dangerous climate change (please tick the according box)? O EUR 12 O EUR
20 O EUR 40 O EUR 120
b. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 to evade climate change has been
earned and you have invested a total of EUR 16 in the 10 rounds. How much money will you be
paid out? My payout is EUR ________.
c. In how many rounds can the players decide freely about their investments into climate
protection (please tick the according box)? O in 3 rounds O in 5 rounds O in 7 rounds O in 10
rounds
d. Please refer to the example stated under point 4 for the numbers. What do the balances
on Despina’s and Metis’ private accounts state? Despina’s balance states EUR _________.
Metis’ balances states EUR _______.
e. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. How much would the group have to pay
into the climate account in the next four rounds in total to abate dangerous climate change (please
tick the according box)? O EUR 12 O EUR 52 O EUR 68 O EUR 120
f. When do the players state their first declaration of intent and when can they revise this
declaration? First declaration after round: ______. Revision after round: _______.
g. In your first declaration of intent after round 3 you are asked to state how much you want to
invest in climate protection in the following seven rounds in total. If you want to invest averagely
EUR 2 per round, which amount would you have to state in your declaration of intent (please tick
the according box)? O EUR 2 O EUR 12 O EUR 14 O EUR 20
h. Are the declarations of intent binding for the investment decisions in the following rounds
(please tick the according box)? O Yes O No
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i. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. What do the figures in the left column
“Planned climate account” stand for (please tick the according box)? O the invested amounts of
the first three rounds O the planned investments for the last seven rounds O the invested amounts
of the first three rounds plus the planned investments for the last seven rounds
j. Please refer to the example stated under point 4 for the numbers again. Please assume
that all players adhere to their declaration of intent (see “geplantes Klimakonto”). Would the
investments be enough to evade dangerous climate change (please tick the according box)? O Yes
O No
k. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 has not been earned. With which
probability will you lose the remaining amount on your private account (please tick the according
box)? O 10% O 30% O 50% O 70% O 90% O 100%
If you have answered all control questions, please signal us. We will come to you and check the
answers. Once are no remaining questions, the game starts. Good Luck!
2 Supporting theoretical analyses
2.1 Game tradeoffs
As noted in S3, the multiplicity of equilibria in the game makes classification virtually impossible.
The game utilized here is a modified n-person stochastic threshold public goods game, with a total
of ten rounds of which only seven allow freedom of choice over the three possible actions.
For illustrative purposes, we provide a hypothetical scenario in Table S2. Assume the group
has just completed round nine, with an aggregate contribution of €108 (i.e. they are on track);
assume further that four players stick to €2 in round ten, unilaterally bringing the account to €116.
If the two remaining players were convinced, say due to previous contribution patterns, that only
the two of them would consider deviating from the intermediate €2 contribution in the last round,
they would be facing the following figures:
Table S2: End payoffs (and corresponding final climate account values in parentheses) to the row
player given round-nine moves. Entries on or below the antidiagonal are certain, while the starred
entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account loss.
Ultimately, the decision depends largely, in this situation, on the degree of risk aversion and on
mutual expectations. We argue that a third driver of behavior should not be overlooked, namely
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moral heuristics. In particular, especially if previous departures from symmetric burden sharing
introduced the need and led to altruistic acts by some of the players, inequity aversion might
motivate the latter to refuse participation in an unfair outcome, even at a dear cost to them and
the others. In our experimental setting, we expect these situations to arise more frequently in
the treatments with initial unequalizing rounds, as they are likely to result in greater disparities
among players (due to the constrained behavior in the early rounds).
Inequity aversion may be determinant in guiding the decision based on Table S2-type of sce-
narios. If for example a player is risk-averse but strongly resists disadvantageous inequity (has a
high α parameter, in the terminology of S8 ), he or she will be unwilling to compensate for the
actions of the risk-seeker(s).
Let’s return to the above example in order to evaluate how inequity aversion may steer the
end result towards successful or unsuccessful coordination. In its absence, a risk-seeking player
believing the opponent to be risk-averse (i.e. placing a high probability on his/her choosing the
high round contribution of €4), might be inclined to take a chance and choose €0 in the last
round. Symmetrically, a risk-averse individual, say the column player, fearing to see the certainty
of a gain jeopardized as a result of free-riding, may well opt for contributing €4. In that case, the
two contributions would offset each other and €120 would be reached (top right entry in Table S2).
This situation is reminiscent of the snow drift game, which differs from the prisoner dilemma game
in that unilateral action, while not as desirable as shared cooperation, still provides a benefit to its
pursuer (S9 ). However, if risk aversion is dominated by inequity aversion, the column player may
choose either the €2 or the €0 contribution, if believing row player to free-ride, thus leading to the
highly inefficient outcome represented by the top left and top middle cells. Highly inefficient since
they do not guarantee certainty of success, notwithstanding the substantial contributions, which
on average are close to €2/round per player.
2.2 Impact of the computerized rounds
As discussed above, in two symmetric treatments the players witness three rounds of unavoidable
€2 contributions, while in the remaining two asymmetric treatments the players undergo three
unequalizing rounds resulting in half of the group being wealthier than the remaining half. At
the group level, independent of the treatment, they contribute €36 to the public good before
round four begins, keeping them on track with respect to the threshold. What is the impact of
this mechanism on the attainable game equilibria? First of all, it makes the achievement of the
threshold collectively optimal as otherwise the already invested €36 would have been wasted.
At the risk of oversimplifying the complexity of the 6-person, 10-round game, we present payoff
matrices in Table S3, with the aim to highlight some key characteristics of the game in (S3) and
in the present work. The left matrix concerns the former, while the centre and right matrices
respectively summarize the outcome of interactions in the symmetric and asymmetric games in-
troduced here. For the sake of presentational clarity, we have simplified the analysis by assuming
that two subgroups of three players choosing the same strategy form, effectively reducing the type
of interactions to those present in the familiar 2x2 formulation. That is, the three players in each
subgroup act identically, as if they tacitly coordinated on the same choices. Moreover, in Table S3
players can only choose between either free-riding in all active rounds (no contributions), or always
contributing the intermediate amount of €2/round (S10 ). This simplification allows analyzing
the game as if it was a one shot game, where people simultaneously reason on the outcome from
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Table S3: A coordination game situation: end payoffs (and corresponding final climate account
values in parentheses). Selfish refers to the strategy of giving €0 in each of the active rounds
(10 rounds in the left matrix, 7 in the remaining two), Fair to giving €2/active round. While all
matrices are based on an initial endowment of €40, in the games introduced here the endowment
before round 4 is either €34 for all players (centre matrix), or alternatively €28 for “poor” row
players and €40 for “rich” column players (right matrix). Payoffs above the antidiagonal are
certain, while the starred entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account loss.
picking one of two strategies leading to the corresponding group level Nash equilibria (keeping in
mind the above discussion on the no longer attainable Nash equilibria).
Comparing the three cases, we notice that, when choosing between no contribution and the
intermediate contribution in the respective games, best response behavior leads to two pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria where all players coordinate on either the free-riding or the intermediate €2
strategy, irrespective of which matrix we consider. However, while in the left matrix both are pay-
off equivalent, with the €2/round equilibrium being a weak Nash equilibrium and the €0/round
equilibrium being strict, in the symmetric game in the centre of Table S3 the intermediate con-
tribution equilibrium is payoff dominant (and both are strict). Lastly, in the asymmetric one, the
intermediate contribution equilibrium is again payoff dominant, although it is weak, unlike the
no contribution equilibrium which is strict. This analysis confirms that the games experimentally
tested here can be seen as coordination games of the Stag Hunt kind, with the trade-off between
social cooperation and safety being represented by the more rewarding €2/round strategy versus
the safer €0/round strategy, which does not require coordination to succeed (S11 ).
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Table S4: Probit estimation of treatment effects. Dependent variable: success of player’s group.
Numbers are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (clustered at group level). Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
3 Supporting empirical analyses
3.1 Contribution trajectories
What is not captured in the treatment-wise comparisons of success rates in public good provision
(Fig. 1 in the main text, Table S4 and Table S7) is the difference in behavior between failing groups,
which sheds light on the motivation (or lack of thereof) to provide the public good of climate
protection. While in Base and Pledge failing groups provided only €70 and €62.7 respectively,
failing groups participating in Base-Unequal and Pledge-Unequal contributed a remarkable €95.5
and €88, despite the lower success rate in the latter two (-30% in Base-Unequal w.r.t. Base,
and -10% in Pledge-Unequal w.r.t. Pledge). This evidence, together with questionnaire analysis,
suggests that the role of the asymmetric endowments is to render coordination more complex.
However, the increased failure rate is not simply the result of a decision by a larger proportion of
group members to opt for a no contribution strategy in the hope of high earnings. Many groups
in these two treatments clearly tried to reach the €120 threshold until the last rounds, therefore
increasing average contribution relative to the failing groups in Base and Pledge, who often behaved
as if they tacitly agreed on gambling with the probability, due to low contributions in the early
rounds. In fact 6/8 failing groups (75%) in Base and Pledge combined provided ≤ €70, while in
the corresponding asymmetric treatments only 2/12 failing groups (17%) provided ≤ €70. In other
words, the inequality undermined the groups’ ability to effectively coordinate on the prevention of
simulated climate change damage, rather than their motivation, which is actually higher than in
symmetric treatments.
3.2 Contribution dynamics and role of pledges
Taking a closer look at Base-Unequal, an analysis of the dynamics of contributions provides a
perspective on the patterns behind the high number of failures that characterized this treatment.
Fig. S1 shows, for all treatments, the instances of €0, €2 and €4 contributions, respectively, in a
given round. Note that, in order to have comparable figures, round four is not considered in the
chart, which instead focuses on contributions in rounds five to seven and eight to ten.
The trend shaping in Base-Unequal between early and later rounds is quite pronounced: no
contribution instances increase on average by 32%, intermediate contributions decrease by 14%
and high contributions drop by 21% in the last three rounds. This account explains the almost
ubiquitous coordination failure among participants: no contribution instances increase over time,
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Figure S1: Contributions in early and late rounds. Amounts invested in rounds 5-7 and 8-10 to
protect climate in: (a) Base; (b) Pledge; (c) Base-Unequal; (d) Pledge-Unequal
while both intermediate contributions and high contributions decrease over time, leaving little
scope for catching up in the final rounds.
Unsurprisingly, the two treatments characterized by the highest success rate, Pledge and Pledge-
Unequal, owe much of it to the different dynamics, since contributions in round four where similar
across all treatments. Let us consider Pledge first: the 70% success rate is the result of main-
taining the number of no contributions relatively constant, having a high number of intermediate
contributions, and compensating the intermediate contributions decline with a 71% increase in
high contributions in the last three rounds.
Let us now take a closer look at the dynamics in Pledge-Unequal and Base-Unequal, since both
are subject to three unequalizing rounds at the beginning. Although the number of no contributions
in Pledge-Unequal is higher in rounds five to seven relative to Base-Unequal, the number of selfish
acts did reduce to 6.4 in the last three rounds. For what concerns the €2 count, the differences are
not stark, as in the six rounds combined the Pledge-Unequal participants chose this contribution
level close to 14 times, while the Base-Unequal participants chose it 16 times. What ultimately
proved to be determinant for success were the number of high contributions, which in several
instances sufficed to offset the no contributions. We read this as improved coordination stemming
from a commitment that, while nonbinding, nevertheless was an important vehicle of intentions
among the participants. As noted before, such “lubricant of coordination” was particularly effective
in the presence of inequalities, which presumably increased the complexity of coordination by
bringing fairness issues to the table, with potentially contrasting interpretations over the moral
obligations stemming from them (see Section 3.3). It should be noted that the subjects took
seriously the opportunity to express their planned contributions. In Pledge-Unequal, for instance,
the average contributions are almost identical to the corresponding pledges: between round four
and round ten, contributions amounted to €72 and pledges to €71; in the last three rounds,
contributions amounted to €31.8 and pledges to €32.6.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 in the main text, the pledges were determinant for the success rate. The
value -0.0397 of Pledge gap rd. 4-10 in Table S5 means that, at the mean of all three independent
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Table S5: Probit estimation of pledge effects (Fig. 2). Dependent variable: success of player’s
group. Numbers are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables, robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at group level). Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
variables, an increase by 10€ in the difference between cumulative contributions and pledges in
rounds 4 to 10 reduces the probability of being in a successful group by about 40%. Similarly, an
increase by 10€ in the difference between cumulative contributions and pledges in rounds 8 to 10
reduces the probability of being in a successful group by about 63%.
So far we have only tangentially discussed contributions in the first active round of play, namely
round four. While, as noted above, variation across treatments is limited, an interesting aspect is
whether there are marked differences between average round four contributions in failing groups
with respect to successful ones. The answer is yes (see also the main text): in all treatments success
in the entire game is highly linked to contributions in round four. The twenty groups that were able
to coordinate to protect the climate had average individual contributions of €1.9 (corresponding
to €11.4 at the group level), while the remaining twenty groups had initial individual provisions
of €1.2 (corresponding to €7.3 at the group level). We therefore conjecture that the first actions
carry an important weight as they signal the members’ commitment in taking quantifiable efforts
early on. In terms of feasible trajectories to reach the €120 target, this difference is a small burden,
as it only takes slightly more than one contribution of €4 in the ensuing six rounds to compensate
the gap accumulated in round four between successful and unsuccessful groups. Yet, we argue that
this lack of early initiative has deep symbolic value and explains the resulting differences in success
rate.
3.3 Inequality
We have seen that inequality impeded coordination among the players. Now we will analyze in more
detail how the groups in the asymmetric treatments Base-Unequal and Pledge-Unequal handled
the inequality and compare the handling between groups which successfully reached the threshold
and groups which did not. The successful groups were strikingly effective in eliminating inequality
(Fig. 3 in the main text). Both the rich players and the poor players contributed on average €20
to the climate account. Thereby, 92% of the rich players and also 92% of the poor players gave €20
or more. In case of failure, we do not consider the groups that abandoned the ship and decided to
gamble but only the groups that actually tried (but failed) to reach the target. In these groups,
the poor players paid on average €21 into the climate account while the rich players gave only €16.
Thereby, 83% of the poor players but only 28% of the rich players paid €20 or more. However, the
rich players did not completely refuse to invest. The majority (83%) invested €14 or more. That
means they were willing to reduce but not to eliminate inequality. The poor players on the other
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hand were not willing to accept inequality. Obviously the rich and the poor had different views on
what is the appropriate contribution for each type of player. In the end, the persistence in their
different viewpoints was crucial and caused the shipwreck of the group. The pledges appeared to
be of great help in mitigating these differences since in the Pledge-Unequal treatment 75% of the
groups managed to eliminate inequality and reach the target while in the Base-Unequal treatment
only 33% of the groups managed to do so. We come back to this point in the next section, which
discusses the questionnaire data.
3.4 Questionnaire
After the experiment subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire about the motivation for their
contribution decisions during the game and their general opinion about climate change (see Table
S6).
The summary statistics of the players’ motivation for their contribution decisions during the
game is somewhat complicated because on the one hand we used open questions to elicit the motives
and on the other hand the motives obviously depend on the respective group performance. The
qualitative categorization of responses reveals that the majority of players is primarily motivated
by the achievement of the threshold (43%), fairness considerations (18%), material self-interest
(15%), and the past group performance (14%). Understandably, the poor players in the asymmetric
treatments Base-Unequal and Pledge-Unequal care more about fairness than the rich players (22%
versus 15%) and more about the past group performance (27% versus 14%). About 6% of all
subjects state that they are particularly motivated by the climate protection realized through
the purchase and retirement of the CO2 certificates. In the final round the players are primarily
motivated by the achievement of the threshold (42%), material self-interest (18%), the hopelessness
to reach the threshold (14%), and fairness considerations (11%). The self-reported motives are in
line with the actual behavior in the game, e.g. people stating that fairness was the most important
reason often contributed €20 to the climate account while people stating the self-interest was
their primary motive mostly gave less than €20. The self-reported motives furthermore help to
understand why some groups did not reach the threshold. Comparing the successful groups that
reached the threshold and the groups that did not, fairness considerations were more important
for the successful groups (23% versus 13%) as well as the achievement of the target (52% versus
35%) while self-interest (9% versus 20%) and the past group performance (8% versus 21%) were
less important.
In order to elicit players’ fairness perceptions, the subjects in the asymmetric treatments were
asked whether they agree with the following statement: “Those who began in round 4 with a
starting capital of €40 should pay more into the climate account in the following seven rounds
than the other players”. Overall, 76% of subjects agree with that statement, 10% disagree, and
14% neither agree nor disagree. However, there are significant differences between poor and rich
subjects: out of the poor players, 90% agree, 5% disagree and 5% do neither of them while out of
the rich players only 62% agree, 15% disagree and 23% do neither of them. In another question,
subjects were asked “What would you consider a fair average investment for the last seven (active)
rounds for those beginning with €40 and for those beginning with €28?” Possible answers include
€0, €1, €2, €3, and €4. Almost all of the poor players (95%) perceive €3 as the fair amount
for the rich players while only 72% of the rich players share this perception. Similarly, only 23%
of the poor players perceive €2 as the fair average contribution for the poor players while 42%
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of the rich players state that this would be the fair amount. These specific amounts (€3 for the
rich and €2 for the poor) are relevant because they reflect the application of the different equity
principles. In order to equalize the players’ contributions and payments the rich should contribute
€20 in the active rounds, i.e. on average €3 per round; conversely, if the past actions were to
be discounted and only contributions in active rounds mattered, all players (including the poor)
would be expected to give €2 in each round.
Table S6: Selected questions and responses from Questionnaire (translated from German)
A determinant of the subjects’ willingness to invest in the public good was the presence of
individuals who would overcome self-interest considerations. In Table S7 we report the results of
regression analysis on the impact of some of the answers in Table S6 on contributions to the public
good. Questions 4 and 5 in the former asked to describe the three most important reasons for
subjects’ investment decisions, over the entire game and in the last round, respectively. Having
chosen altruistic compensation for free-riders as motivation for the contribution decision in round
10 positively and significantly explains players’ average contributions over all rounds (variable
“Altruism rd. 10” in Table S7, n=240, P<.0001). Conversely, if individuals were motivated by
self-interest, both generally and when deciding the last round contribution, game contributions
decreased (n=240, P=.0006 and P<.0001 respectively). A similar negative effect arose when the
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Table S7: Linear regression of individual contributions. Dependent variable: Player’s cumulative
contributions over rounds 1-10. Tobit is bounded between 0 and 40. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered at group level). Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
primary motivation for contribution decisions was identified as a belief that the €120 threshold
would not be reached both generally and when deciding the last round contribution (n=240,
P=.0010 and P<.0001 for variables “Abandon ship” and “Abandon ship rd.10” respectively).
Lastly, we visualize the effect of risk aversion as elicited in question 3 on players’ overall con-
tributions in Fig. S2: as expected, contributions increase with risk aversion.
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Figure S2: Mean investment in avoiding simulated dangerous climate change declines when the
subjects are more prone to “gambling for global goods”
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